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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
INTERIORS CONTRACTING
INCORPORATED, and ACTION FIRE
SPRINKLER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
PlaintiffsRespondents,

v.
NAVALCO, a Utah corporation,
aka NAVALCO OF UTAH, et al.,
DefendantAppellant,

v.
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC.,

Cross-claim
DefendantRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17096

* * * * * * *
BRIEF OF CROSS-CLAIM DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
Cross-claimant and appellant, Navalco of Utah ("Navalco"),
seeks to overturn the finding of the lower court that it waived
its cross-claim against Green Acres of America ("Green Acres")
for failure to present the cross-claim to the trial court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Based upon the representations of counsel for Navalco
and Green Acres that settlement had been reached between the
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parties and no further action on the cross-claim was required by
the trial court, Judge Winder did not rule on the cross-claim
brought by Navalco as against Green Acres.

Subsequently, Judge

Durham denied Navalco's Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree whereby Navalco moved
the court for judgment on the cross-claim of Navalco as against
Green Acres.

Judge Durham held that Navalco had waived its

cross-claim against Green Acres by failing to present the issue
for decision at trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the denial of the lower court's
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Decree affirmed on the basis that Navalco waived its
cross-claim against Green Acres.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with that portion of appellant's
statement of facts as it describes the lease arrangements among
Navalco, Green Acres, and Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. and its statement
that the Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. "engage[d] various persons to
apply materials to the premises (e.g. Exhibit 2-P), but thereafter
found itself unable to pay all the amounts due."

Respondent

further agrees with appellant's statements that liens were filed
against the premises by certain of the parties named to this
action and that all claims as against Green Acres and Roy E. and
Carol M. Christensen were dismissed with the exception of the
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claim between Green Acres and Lincoln, Tohara and Tohara.
Further, respondent agrees with appellant's statements that it
filed a cross-claim against Green Acres of America "claiming that
pursuant to the provisions of the lease, said Defendant was
obligated to hold Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, harmless
for any loss in these proceedings'' and that Judge Winder made no
ruling on said cross-claim.

However, respondent controverts

certain of the facts set forth by appellant beginning in the last
paragraph of page 5 of its brief whereby appellant attempts to
establish the facts underlying its failure to present its crossclaim at trial and the subsequent finding of waiver of the crossclaim.
Beginning November 6, trial of the above-entitled
matter, Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, was had before
the Honorable David K. Winder.

Pursuant to the Pre-Trial Order

entered by the Honorable Jay E. Banks all remaining issues in the
case were before Judge Winder for decision, including the crossclaim of Navalco by which it sought indemnification from Green
Acres with respect to any judgment entered against it on any
pending mechanics' lien claims, as well as reimbursement for
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by it in defending the claims
brought against it.

(R.688)

Prior to trial, settlement negotiations were entered
into by counsel for Navalco, Mr. Glen H. Hatch, and counsel for
Green Acres, Ms. Barbara K. Polich.

(R. 979-980, Affidavit of
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Glen H. Hatch).

During the negotiations, Navalco sought to be

reimbursed for only those attorneys' fees incurred by Navalco
through the bringing of its motion for summary judgment against

all lien claimants, despite the fact that the court denied Navalco'
motion with respect to Action Fire Sprinkler Company and Interiors
Contracting, Inc.

Mr. Hatch stated that inasmuch as it was the

actions of Navalco rather than the actions of Green Acres that

caused this claim to continue to trial, Navalco should be responsible for incurring those attorneys' fees and costs.

(R. 979-980,

Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch; R. 930, Affidavit of Barbara K.
Polich).

Mr. Hatch further stated to counsel for Green Acres

that he did not believe a judgment could be rendered against
Navalco except to the extent that Navalco induced reliance by the
claimants to finish the job.

Specifically in his affidavit Mr.

Hatch states that he
[A]ssumed that the only issue involving Navalco
remaining in the case was in the nature of an
estoppel question as between Navalco and the
Plaintiffs [Interiors Contracting, Inc. and
Action Fire Sprinkler Company] resulting from
certain conversations between the Plaintiffs
and Navalco's agents that Affiant did not
assume reimbursement would be required for
this.
(R. 979-980).

Mr. Hatch represented to counsel for Green Acres that
attorneys' fees had been incurred in the approximate amount of
$2,300, which amount did not include the attorneys' fees incurred

to continue to defend against the claims of Action Fire Sprinkler
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Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc. subsequent to the denial
of summary judgment.

(R. 980, Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch).

Green Acres offered to pay $2,000 of the amount incurred for
attorneys' fees and costs if the cross-claim was dismissed in its
entirety.

Mr. Hatch at that time indicated to Ms. Polich that he

would accept payment of $2,000 as settlement of the cross-claim.
It was agreed that both parties would review the final written
document setting forth the oral agreement.

{R. 929-930, Affidavit

of Barbara K. Polich).
On that basis, a representation was made to Judge
Winder by Ms. Polich that Green Acres and Navalco had reached a
settlement and therefore the trial court need not consider the
cross-claim of Navalco as against Green Acres.

This representation

was made at the close of putting on evidence on the claims pending
between Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler
Company and Navalco and at such time as Mr. Hatch asked leave of
the court for his dismissal.

In responding to the court's inquiry

as to whether or not anyone had any objections to Mr. Hatch
leaving, Ms. Polich responded as follows:
No. I just wanted to
Claim pending between
but we have reached a
for your information,
that.
(R. 1232).

have--there is a CrossNavalco and Green Acres,
tentative settlement. So
there will be nothing on

Mr. Hatch did not take issue with the statement of

Ms. Polich at that time nor did he indicate to the court at any
other time during the trial that Navalco's cross-claim was still
viable and still before the court.
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Subsequent to trial but prior to a decision being
rendered, the Settlement Agreement was drafted by Ms. Polich.
Ms. Polich called Mr. Hatch and went over each of the points of
the Settlement Agreement.
Polich).

(R. 931, Affidavit of Barbara K.

At that time the draft agreement contained provisions

of payment to Navalco by Green Acres for $2,000, assignment to
Green Acres of awards of attorneys' fees made to Navalco, and
dismissal of the cross-claim in full.
Agreement).

(R. 933-937, Settlement

Counsel for the parties represented that each had

received approval from their respective clients to the terms of
the agreement.

However, it was understood that each party could

revise the final written draft to insure it reflected the terms
of the oral agreement.
Mr. Hatch by Ms. Polich.

Subsequently, the agreement was sent to
(R. 931).

Subsequent to December 13, 1979, the date the Memorandum Decision was issued by Judge Winder, Mr. Hatch reviewed the
settlement agreement and at that time first informed counsel for
Green Acres that Green Acres should be responsible for reimbursing Navalco for the judgment which had been rendered against
it.

(R. 981, Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch; R. 930-931, Affidavit

of Barbara K. Polich).

Counsel for Green Acres pointed out that

it had been agreed by counsel as part of the settlement agreement
that all claims were to be dismissed, including any indemnification
claims with respect to any and all judgments rendered against
Navalco.

Mr. Hatch indicated at that time that that was not his
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intent.

He subsequently returned the settlement agreement.

However, it is significant to note that Mr. Hatch indicated to
counsel for Green Acres that the settlement agreement adequately
reflected the agreement entered into by the parties with respect
to attorneys' fees.

The only issue of dispute was whether or not

the cross-claim was to have been dismissed in total.

(R. 931, R.

981).

At no time was any exception made in the pre-trial
order, or by any ruling of the court during trial, to preserve
the issue of Navalco's cross-claim against Green Acres for decision subsequent to the trial.

Therefore, Green Acres did not try

that issue nor argue it to the court, nor did Navalco do so.
On December 18, 1979, Navalco filed its Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree to
have the court enter an order awarding a judgment over against
Green Acres for indemnification as well as for attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in defending against this action and pursuing
its cross-claim against Green Acres.

Specifically, Navalco asked

that the Conclusions of Law be amended as follows:
Defendant, Navalco of Utah, should have
judgment against Defendant, Green Acres of
America, Inc., in the amounts provided in
paragraph 1 hereinabove [setting forth the
judgment awarded to plaintiffs as against
Navalco] together with its costs of Court
and such reasonable attorney's fees as are
awarded against Navalco of Utah. In the
event that said parties fail to settle the
claims for attorney's fees by Navlaco of
Utah against Green Acres of America, Inc.
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for its expense in defending this action,
then a reasonable attorney's fees should be
awarded and determined in accordance with
paragraph 5 hereinabove [granting Interiors
Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler
Company a reasonable attorney's fee from
Navalco, the exact amount reserved for a
later determination].
(R. 838-841, Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment and Decree).

The only issues argued to the district

court was whether or not the settlement agreement was to be enforce,
or whether or not there had been a waiver of the cross-claim.

Mr.

Hatch filed an affidavit in support of that motion to which reference has been made above.

No argument was had on the merits as

Judge Durham indicated that if she found that Navalco still had a
viable claim, she would request that counsel argue the merits of
the claim.
While the Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment and Decree was under consideration by Judge
Durham, Navalco brought a Motion for New Trial on the cross-claim
of Navalco against Green Acres.

That motion was denied by virtue

of Judge Durham's ruling that Navalco waived its cross-claim
against Green Acres.

(R. 993, Order and Judgment).
ARGUMENT
I .

BASED UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTIONS OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR JUDGE
WINDER TO NOT RULE ON THE CROSS-CLAIM OF
NAVALCO.
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It is the position of Navalco that because its crossclaim against Green Acres was set forth in its initial pleadings
and subsequently in its trial brief, it was error for Judge
Winder to fail to rule on that cross-claim despite the representations to Judge Winder at trial that a settlement had been
reached between Green Acres and Navalco.

A review of the circum-

stances surrounding the absence of a ruling from Judge Winder on
the cross-claim will show that both Navalco and Green Acres had
represented to the Court that there was no need for consideration
by the court of that cross-claim; thus it was not error for Judge

Winder to not rule on the cross-claim.
Navalco states at page 13 of its brief that the crossclaim of Navalco against Green Acres was set forth in the original
pleadings filed by Navalco and further it was set forth in
Navalco's trial memorandum (R. 715, Memorandum of Defendant,
Navalco of Utah).
Navalco.

Respondent does not dispute this statement by

Navalco goes on to argue that because it was its inten-

tion to rely on a lease agreement between Navalco and Green Acres
for purposes of arguing the cross-claim, and because the lease
was made an exhibit in the trial of the claim pending between
plaintiffs Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler,
and Navalco, there was no reason for Navalco to affirmatively
argue or otherwise raise the cross-claim at trial before Judge
Winder. Navalco further goes on to state that once judgment was
awarded in favor of the plaintiffs and against Navalco, Judge
Winder had a "duty to then rule upon the Cross Complaint."
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The argument of Navalco has a serious omission.
Specifically, Navalco fails to point out to the court that at the
close of the case between plaintiffs and Navalco, Mr. Hatch asked
the court that he be excused inasmuch as he had no further
matters pending before the court.

The relevant portion of the

transcript reads as follows:
MR. HATCH: Assuming we now rest, are you
going to take arguments now or try the other
parts of the case?
THE COURT: Well, I think we better take
arguments all at one time, if you don't mind.
Let's try the case because otherwise - well, of
course, we have all got to be here for the
whole thing. I am wondering if there isn't
some way - at least, Mr. Anderson could leave
at this point.
MR. HATCH: I think both Mr. Anderson and
myself could leave because we have Summary
Judgments on all of the others here. Judge
Durham granted us a Summary Judgment as to all
of the defendants, the other defendants.
(R. 1232).

The court then inquired as to whether or not anyone had
any objections to Mr. Hatch and Mr. Anderson leaving.

Although

there were no objections, Ms. Polich explained to the court that
there had been a cross-claim pending between Navalco and Green
Acres, but the matter no longer required the decision of the
court.

Specifically, that portion of the transcript reads as

follows:
THE COURT: Well, does anyone have any
objection to Mr. Hatch and Mr. Anderson leaving
or can you think of any reason why they ought
to be required to remain at this point?
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MS. POLICH: No. I just wanted to have there is a cross-claim pending between Navalco and
Green Acres, but we have reached a tentative
settlement. So for your information, there will
be nothing on that.
THE COURT: Let me refer to the bottom of
your Memorandum, Ms. Polich, where you talk about
these cases. Of course, that was typed before my
ruling this morning on Gray's Electric. So it -the only claims that do remain are Mr. Lincoln,
Mr. Tohara and Mr. Tohara against Green Acres and
the one we just heard and then Gray's Electric
against Green Acres. Is that it?
MS. POLICH:

That is correct.

(R. 1232-1233).
It is significant to note that Mr. Hatch at no time
disagreed with Ms. Polich's statement that a settlement had been
reached between Navalco and Green Acres and that the court need
not consider the claim.

Also, when the court, in insuring that

it understood all the claims before it for consideration, explicitly identified each of the claims it intended to consider
and did not include the cross-claim of Navalco, Mr. Hatch said
nothing.

If it was the intention of Mr. Hatch that Judge Winder

rule on the claim between Navalco and Green Acres, he certainly
did not evidence that to the court.
Subsequently, the closing argument was had on the claim
between Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler
Company and Navalco.

At the close of argument, Mr. Hatch asked

if he might be dismissed.

The court responded that "Mr. Hatch

and Mr. Anderson and their clients may be excused."

(R. 1254).

No closing arguments were had on the cross-claim between Navalco
and Green Acres of America.
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Given that a representation was made to Judge Winder
that a settlement agreement had been reached between Navalco and
Green Acres, coupled with Mr. Hatch's acquiescence in the court's
identification of the claims still pending before him, which
identification did not include the cross-claim between Green
Acres and Navalco, it was not error for Judge Winder to not rule
on the cross-claim pending between Navalco and Green Acres.

The

circumstances of the case clearly establish that it could not
have been the intent of Navalco to receive a ruling by Judge
Winder on the cross-claim.
II .

IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO FIND THAT
NAVALCO HAD WAIVED IT CROSS-CLAIM FOR FAILURE
TO PRESENT THE CLAIM AT TRIAL.
The record of the case clearly demonstrates that
Navalco neither presented its cross-claim against Green Acres at
trial nor reserved the claim for resolution at a later time;
therefore, Judge Durham properly denied Navalco's Motion to Amend
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on
the basis that Navalco waived its cross-claim against Green
Acres.
Judge Durham, in ruling on Navalco's Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree,
correctly stated the law and applied it to its facts of the
instant case as is evidenced in her Memorandum Opinion dated
April 23, 1980.

(R. 988-989).

The relevant portion of that

Memorandum Opinion reads as follows:
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1. Navalco's Motion to Amend is denied.
The transcript of the trial shows that Navalco
waived it cross-claim against Green Acres by
failing to submit it to the court for ruling at
the time of trial, and by not objecting when
opposing counsel indicated to the court that it
was settled and did not require a ruling.
There was nothing to prevent its litigation at
trial, and it was no where specifically reserved.
Therefore, the general rule that issues which
could have been raised may not be thereafter
li~ig~ted is applicable, and res judicata
principles govern. The fact that the chances
of succeeding on the cross-claim look better
after trial than they did before and during
does not give rise to a right to belatedly
raise a claim that could have been disposed of
at trial, but was not because of the acquiescence
of counsel.
( R. 988) •

It is clearly the law in Utah that unless a claim is
explicitly reserved for determination at a later time, all claims
pending before the trial court are to be resolved at the time of
trial.

Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 248, 516 P.2d 348 (1973).
Orderly procedure requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or
theories to the trial court, and he cannot
thereafter urge a different theory in an attempt
to prolong litigation. [Footnote omitted.]

If this were not the rule of law, it would be possible for cases

to be tried piecemeal as the losing party found elements which it
had previously failed to litigate.
This Court explicitly ruled in Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah
I

573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950) that where a party can present an issue
at trial but chooses not to do so, the issue is waived and cannot
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subsequently be revived.

In Upton a pre-trial order allowed the

defendant to introduce evidence establishing that the tax deeds
involved in the suit were invalid.

The court ruled that failure

of the defendant to introduce the evidence constituted waiver of
that issue and therefore, defendants were precluded from raising
it before the Supreme Court.
It may be that, under the pre-trial order as
framed, the defendants could have proceeded to
introduce evidence establishing that the tax
deeds were invalid. They did not, however,
choose to do so, and thus waived this issue in
the trial court, and may not now raise it
before this court.
223 P.2d at 430.
And in Amoss v. Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 1008
(1973) the Ccourt affirmed the district court's dismissal of
appellant's claim when appellant elected not to go forward with a
new trial.

The appellant had been contending that the setting

aside of the jury verdict and granting a new trial was error and
therefore chose not to proceed with a new trial of the issues.
The court noted that the issue was not "reserved for future conside1
ation by stipulation of the parties and the decree of the court
entered therein is res adjudicata."

517 P.2d at 1010.

A review of the record shows that Judge Durham was
correct in finding that Navalco neither presented the claim at
trial nor reserved the claim for later determination by the
court.

Specifically, this finding is supported by the following

facts which have been extensively detailed above.
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1.

Mr. Hatch acquiesed in the statement of counsel for

Green Acres that the cross-claim of Navalco against Green Acres
had been settled.
2.

When Judge Winder indicated those claims still

pending before him and did not indicate that the cross-claim of
Navalco as against Green Acres was still pending before him, Mr.
Hatch again acquiesed in the statement, having said nothing.
3.

No evidence was put on at trial, nor was any closing

argument had on the Navalco cross-claim.
4.

The transcript established that there was no

explicit reservation of the claim for a later determination by the
court.
It further appears from the record that Mr. Hatch simply
did not even consider the possibility of a judgment against Navalco
for the total amount of work performed by plaintiffs, Action Fire
Sprinkler Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc.

As Mr. Hatch

states in his affidavit:
Affiant indicated to Ms. Polich that in his
opinion Defendant's reimbursement should be
based upon services through the granting of
summary judgment against all other Defendants,
but that since Af fiant assumed that the
only issue involving Navalco remaining in
the case was in the nature of an estoppel
question as between Navalco and the Plaintiffs resulting from certain conversations
between the Plaintiffs and Navalco's agents
that [sic] Affiant did not assume reimbursement would be required for this.
(R. 979-980).

The fact that Mr. Hatch assumed and relied on his

belief that Navalco could be found liable only for that portion of
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the work performed by the lien claimants as a result of reliance
upon Navalco's assurances of payment is clearly evidenced by the
fact that Navalco sought only reimbursement by Green Acres of
those attorneys' fees incurred through the bringing of its Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(R. 979).

But it simply makes no sense that

Mr. Hatch would initially take the position that Green Acres was
not liable for any of the attornys' fees incurred in Navalco going
to trial because it was Navalco's own actions which caused the
claims to continue to trial, and then later argue that the crossclaim between Navalco and Green Acres was still viable and before
the trial court with respect to indemnification by Green Acres of
Navalco.
It appears that Mr. Hatch was so certain that Navalco could
be held responsible for only a small portion of the work done by
the lien claimants (that which was induced by reliance upon Navalco 1
statements) that he did not see any reason to present the crossclaim to the court.

However, the underlying reason for Mr. Hatch

not presenting the cross-claim does not change the fact that the
cross-claim was neither presented to the trial court nor reserved.
Mr. Hatch, by second guessing what Judge Winder would rule and by
choosing not to put on his claim took a risk that his failure to
put on the claim would cause its waiver.
Hatch took the risk and lost.

Very simply put, Mr.

And in accordance with the law of

this jurisdiction as set forth in Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573,
223 P.2d 428 (1950) and Amoss v. Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d
1008 (1973), under such circumstances Navalco waived its claim.

-16-
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Lastly, appellant states at page 14 of its brief that
because the Navalco/Green Acres' lease was before the court, there
was no need to argue the· cross-claim to Judge Winder.

Respondent

finds it interesting that appellant believes that Green Acres
would waive any and all right to argue the matter before the
court, if not put on evidence with respect thereto.

Respondent

had taken a very active role throughout the litigation and would
have, under no circumstances, forfeited the right to argue its
position on the cross-claim to the trial court.
Inasmuch as it was the actions and acquiesence of Mr.
Hatch that caused Judge Winder to not rule on the cross-claim
between Navalco and Green Acres, it would be unfair and burdensome
to now reopen the cross-claim and require that Green Acres continue
to litigate this matter.

Inasmuch as the outcome of the indemnifi-

cation claim is known, settlement would now be straightjacketed in
a way unlike prior to trial of the claim.

That is, any chance of

Green Acres to realize a true compromise settlement is destroyed
because the liability of Navalco will be known.

Navalco chose the

manner and timing in which it desired to pursue it cross-claim
against Green Acres and it should be held responsible thereto.
Given the above, it is clear that Mr. Hatch did not
believe Green Acres was liable for any of the work done by Action
Fire Sprinkler Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc. as a result
of their reliance on Navalco; therefore, inasmuch as Mr. Hatch did
not believe there was any possibility, whatsoever, of an adverse
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ruling with respect to the remainder of those lien claims, it
follows that he did not believe that a ruling by Judge Winder on
the cross-claim was necessary.

The resulting conclusion must be

that the claim was neither presented at trial nor reserved; therefore, the finding of Judge Durham that Navalco waived its crossclaim should be affirmed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Given the above, it is clear that Navalco waived its
cross-claim for indemnification and attorneys' fees against Green
Acres.

Therefore, the denial by Judge Durham of appellant's

Motion to Amend Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Decree and the subsequent denial of appellant's Motion for New
Trial should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully subitted this 15th day of September, 1980.

BARBARA K. POLICH
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September,
1980, I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent to Glen Hatch, Haslam & Hatch, 80 West Broadway,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101.
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